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Government Regulation of Railroad Finances *
By Emory R. Johnson

A justification for the discussion of the government regulation
of railroad finances is found in the very size of the task. The
official valuation placed upon railroad property in the United
States is approximately twenty-five billion dollars. The repro
duction cost of this property would probably be once and a half
the official valuation. To maintain this property and to keep it
abreast of technical requirements and to provide for necessary new
facilities requires an annual investment of seven hundred fifty
million dollars.
The importance of the government regulation of railroad
finances grows out of the fact that the railroads and other agencies
of transportation are a fundamental and vital necessity. Upon
adequate transportation depends the welfare of society, economic
activity and progress, and the stability and efficiency of govern
mental administration. These facts have been so often set forth
that it is necessary only to refer to them without discussion.
The reasons why the government of the United States has
undertaken the regulation of the finances of railroads are to be
found partly in the facts just stated. The railroads are one of the
essential utilities by which the public is served. Indeed, the
railroads are the most important of all the utilities, and their
financial administration and development are of concern to the
entire public. Moreover, the investments in the railroads, both
by private individuals and by fiduciary institutions should, in the
interest of the public, be as safe, stable and non-speculative as is
practicable to make such investments by wise government super
vision. At the present moment insurance companies, trust
companies and other similar institutions are much concerned as
to the financial condition of American railroads.
The government regulation of railroad finances began with the
regulation of railroad accounts. The original interstate com
merce act of 1887 gave the interstate commerce commission
authority over the accounts of the carriers subject to the act; but,
as no provision was made for enforcing any system of accounts
that might be prescribed by the commission, no system was
* Address delivered at the annual meeting of the American Institute of Accountants, Septem
ber 15, 1931, at Philadelphia, Pennsylvania.

45

The Journal of Accountancy
prescribed and the accounts remained unregulated until the
passage of the Hepburn act in 1906. This act gave the commis
sion the power not only to prescribe but to enforce uniform ac
counts and with the cooperation of the Association of Railway
Accountants, the commission, with the expert assistance of Henry
Carter Adams of the University of Michigan, worked out a uni
form system of accounts first for the railroads and then for other
carriers subject to the interstate commerce act. Dr. Adams
remained at the head of the bureau of accounts of the commission
for a number of years, and to his wisdom and ability the subse
quent success of the supervision of railroad accounting is largely
due. The bureau of accounts of the interstate commerce com
mission has functioned successfully and with the complete co
operation of the carriers subject to the commission.
Further indirect control by the interstate commerce commission
of the finances of railroads was given by the Mann-Elkins act of
1910 which gave the commission practically complete authority
over the revenues of the carriers. The Hepburn act had given
the commission the power to fix a maximum rate upon the com
plaint of an interested party. The Mann-Elkins act gave the
commission not only the authority to consider rates upon its own
initiative, but the still more important power of suspending pro
posed rates until the commission was satisfied that the rates in
question should go into effect. Ten years later, by the trans
portation act of 1920, the commission was given authority over
minimum rates and at the present time it is the commission rather
than the railroad directorates that determines rate levels and
consequently the revenues of the carriers.
The direct regulation by the government of railroad finances
was provided for by the transportation act of 1920, but one needs
to go back ten years to discover the origin of the provisions of that
act. When at the close of 1909 the Taft administration recom
mended to congress amendments to strengthen the interstate
commerce act one recommendation was that the commission be
given authority to regulate railroad finances. The opposition in
congress prevented the adoption of this recommendation, but
President Taft was authorized to appoint a commission to investi
gate and report upon the subject of the government regulation of
railroad finances. The chairman of the commission appointed
was President Arthur T. Hadley, of Yale University. Under his
very conservative leadership, the Hadley commission recom
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mended publicity of railroad finances without government
regulation.
Some of the states provided for the publicity of the facts re
garding the issue of railroad securities, but publicity proved
ineffective. Indeed, experience showed that the states, no
matter how thoroughly they might regulate the issue of railroad
securities, were unable to deal effectively with the problem.
This was shown by the action taken by the Mellon administration
of the New York, New Haven and Hartford Railroad. The
state of Massachusetts and the state of New York had provided
for the regulation of the issue of railroad securities but the New
Haven railroad was a Connecticut corporation and Connecticut
had not provided for the regulation of railroad finances. Mellon
was thus able to issue new stock without government restraint
and the debacle that followed is well known.
The transportation act of 1920 provided for a comprehensive
and complete regulation of railroad finances by the federal govern
ment. There are indeed four phases of the government regulation
of railroad finances under the act of 1920:
First—The construction of new lines, and thus the expenditure
of funds therefor, must meet with the approval of the commission
and every railroad company is obliged to prove conclusively that
public convenience and necessity require the proposed construction.
Second—The interstate commerce commission must give its
approval to the abandonment of lines in existence. This is in
effect a negative regulation of railroad finances because it gives the
commission authority to require a railroad to spend such funds as
may be necessary to maintain unprofitable branches or facilities
whose operation in the judgment of the commission, is necessary
to the public.
Third—The act of 1920 gives the commission complete author
ity over railroad consolidation and the financing of such consoli
dation. The purchase of one railroad by another must be
approved by the commission. If securities need to be issued to
effect the purchase such securities must be passed upon by the
commission. If two or more railroads are consolidated into one
system the capital of the consolidated system must not exceed the
aggregate value of the properties brought together. Indeed, it
is not an exaggeration to say that the real regulation of consolida
tion is through the commission’s control of the financial operation
involved in consolidation.
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Fourth,—and principally—The act of 1920 provides for the
regulation of railroad finances by giving the interstate commerce
commission authority over the issue of securities. It is interest
ing to note what the policy of the interstate commerce commission
has been as regards the regulation of railroad securities. As would
naturally be expected, the commission at first acted by approving
or denying applications without suggesting modifications of the
applications. Regulation was thus negative rather than con
structive in character. Within a few years, however, it became
more and more the policy of the commission to fix a price at which
bonds might be offered for sale if their issue was approved by the
commission. The commission thus substituted its judgment for
that of the railroad directorates as to financial policy. In view
of the fact that market levels seldom remain stationary for any
considerable length of time it is necessary for the commission to
act promptly upon applications for the issue of securities if the
commission is to determine closely the price within which such
securities shall be marketed. It is to the credit of the commission
that it has acted promptly and I think it will be generally agreed
that on the whole the commission has acted wisely. The third
stage of the policy of the commission in the regulation of railroad
securities has been the exercise of its judgment as to the kind of
securities that may be issued, whether and to what extent securi
ties shall consist of stocks or of bonds. In many instances the
commission has required the applicants to substitute stocks in
part or in whole for proposed issues of bonds. Here again the
commission is substituting its judgment for that of railroad
directorates as to financial policy.
What should be the policy of the interstate commerce com
mission as to the regulation of railroad finances? What is re
quired in the public interest? There are at least five requirements:
The first necessity of the railroads is adequate revenues. Indeed,
the regulation of railroad finances begins with the regulation
of railroad rates and other sources of revenue. The transporta
tion act of 1920 gives the commission the mandate to establish
and adjust rates so as to yield carriers, under economical and effi
cient management, a reasonable return upon a fair value of their
property. The commission is to fix a fair value and the annual
rate of return. The commission has made a tentative valuation
of the railroads and has established 53/4 per cent. as a reasonable
annual return upon such value. As is well known, however,
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economic conditions have prevented the carriers from obtaining
this rate of earning. At the present moment they are probably
securing less than a third of 53/4 per cent. per annum upon the
value of the property used in the service of the public. Presum
ably present conditions are temporary and railroads as well as
other industries will see better days in the not distant future.
Second, another requirement as to government regulation of
railroad finances is that the government requirements as to
expenditures by the carriers shall be reasonable. The interstate
commerce act as amended to date gives the interstate commerce
commission authority in numerous instances to require expendi
tures on the part of the carriers. On the whole, the commission’s
policy has been conservative and there have been but few com
plaints on the part of the carriers as to the commission’s require
ments. Indeed, the commission has more often prevented
railroad corporations from making expenditures than it has made
demands upon the carriers for outlays to carry out the provisions
of the interstate commerce act.
A third requirement as to railroad finances is that the taxation
of the railroads shall be equitable as compared with other prop
erties and particularly as between the railroads and other com
peting carriers. Railroad taxes have risen year by year until 5
per cent. or more of railroad revenues is taken by the government.
During the current year the government will take more than that
percentage of the railroad revenues. This again is a temporary
situation, but in the public interest it seems that federal, state
and local governments should give serious consideration to the
tax burden they are placing upon American railroads.
A fourth requirement as to the policy to be pursued in the
regulation of railroad finances is that such regulation should be
constructive and affirmative rather than negative as regards
railroad consolidation. While it is realized now that more was
expected in 1920 of railroad consolidation than it was possible
to obtain, it is, nevertheless, true today that substantial economies
of operation, administration and finance would result from the
grouping of the railroads of the United States into a limited
number of large systems of relatively equal financial strength and
operating efficiency. The attitude of the interstate commerce
commission towards proposed consolidations has become in
creasingly critical year by year and, on the whole, its present
policy is more negative than constructive. This is unfortunate.
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Fifth—It is of supreme importance that in the government
regulation of railroad finances there should not be an undue
limitation placed upon private initiative. The government
should not take over the financing of railroads. The railroad
directorates should continue to exercise their business judgment
as to what is or is not wise. The substitution of government for
private ownership and management of railroads would be a great
mistake. To carry the government regulation of railroad finances
to the point of substituting complete governmental control for
private control of railway financiering would be disastrous to the
development of American railroads, at least as long as their
ownership is left with private corporations. The general purpose
of the government in the regulation of the finances of railroads
should be to establish the rules and to allow the railroads to play
the game according to those rules. The railroad directors and
officers should be in the game, the government officers on the
sidelines.
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